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This study was conducted to determine empirically the
demand and supply of high quality sailors in the U.S. Navy.
The Navy's demand for high quality sailors is presented in
two dimensions; the entry level demand and utilization
demand. Three forms of enlistment supply models are devel-
oped for high school diploma graduate enlistments and for
high quality enlistments using ordinary least squares regres-
sion methodology. The demand and supply results are then
applied to an increasing size Navy scenario. A two-tier
pay system is implied from the application of the supply
models since the high quality enlistees are less responsive
to pay changes than are high school diploma graduate enlistees
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I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
A. INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force, the
military services and military manpower analysts have been
increasingly concerned with the quantity of enlistees enter-
ing the various services. Additionally, with an ever-
increasing reliance upon high technology equipment, the
military services have begun to feel the need for increasing
qualities in enlistees (Fialka)
.
This study examines two groups of Navy non-prior service
(NPS) males. The first group consists of high school diploma
graduates of all mental categories. The second group of
interest is high quality enlistments, who are defined to be
high school diploma graduate enlistees scoring in Mental
Categories I and II on the Armed Forces Qualification Test
(AFQT) . This thesis attempts to determine empirically the
demand and supply of these two quality levels of U.S. Navy
male non-prior service (NPS) enlistments and explores
alternative compensation methods for obtaining a required
number of high quality enlistees.
The next section of this chapter will present a brief
synopsis of work indicating why the Navy is interested in
high quality enlistees. This chapter concludes with a
review of the major enlistment supply models. Chapter II

will present the methodology to be followed in performing
the analysis of demand and supply of high quality sailors.
The results from the demand and supply data analysis will
be presented in Chapters III and IV. An application of the
analysis to evaluate alternative compensation systems for
enlisting a desired number of high quality sailors will be
presented in Chapter V. The thesis concludes with a summary
and discussion of policy implications in Chapter VI.
3. INTEREST IN HIGH QUALITY SAILORS
In recent years there have been efforts to explain the
various parameters of enlistee performance in the Navy using
enlistee quality. These studies have often defined enlistee
quality in terms of years of education completed or Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) mental categories. The
focus of these studies has largely been upon two factors.
The first factor is performance as measured by pay grade
attainment or by equipment readiness. The second factor is
the propensity of an enlistee to attrite from the Navy.
The Technical Cooperation Program study "Attrition in
the Armed Services of Canada, the UK, and the U.S." recently
examined the quality of personnel in the military services
of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This
study found that in the U.S. Navy "With the exception of
Mental Category IV, the relationship between mental category
and attrition rate is monotonically increasing (Sinaiko and
Scheflen)." The percentage of total attrition at 36 months
10

of service by mental category for U.S. Navy NPS male acces-
sions is presented in Table 1.
TABLE 1
% ATTRITION AT 36 MONTHS OF SERVICE BY MENTAL CATEGORY















SOURCE: Sinaiko and Scheflen
Further, the study presents data on the 1974-75 Navy
NPS male cohort attrition rates with respect to education
level. Here, the high school diploma graduates (HSDG)
displayed a lower attrition rate than non-high school
diploma graduates during the first 36 months of service.
These data are presented in Table 2.
TABLE 2
% ATTRITION DURING THE FIRST 36 MONTHS
OF SERVICE BY EDUCATION LEVEL
(1974-75 U.S. Navy Cohort)
LOS HSDG Non-HSDG
0-6 months 8.8 22.4
0-12 months 12.9 30.5
0-36 months 27.3 57.0
SOURCE: Sinaiko and Scheflen
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The Navy Recruiting Command has been using a model
developed by Lockman at the Center for Naval Analyses called
"Success Chances of Recruits Entering the Navy (SCREEN)."
The SCREEN model is the result of regression analysis on a
number of recruit quality factors. Among the factors ana-
lyzed, membership in Mental Category I or II or possession
of a high school diploma indicates a much higher likelihood
of completing two years of service in the Navy (SCREEN)
.
A study by Horowitz and Sherman from the Center for Naval
Analyses investigates the impact of quality of personnel
aboard a sample of cruisers, frigates, and destroyers. In
it, the quality of personnel is matched against the material
condition of the ship on which the personnel are stationed.
Horowitz and Sherman conclude that "high quality personnel
are, in general, more valuable on ships with the most complex
equipment (Horowitz and Sherman) .
"
In "A Study of Relationships Between Educational Creden-
tials and Military Performance Criteria" by Elster and Flyer,
pay grade attainment is investigated as a function of educa-
tion and mental category. Assuming that pay grade attain-
ment is a suitable proxy for job performance, it can be seen
from Table 3 that high quality sailors are better perform-
ers in the Navy. From the Calendar Year 1977 cohort, 62
percent of the high quality accessions advanced to petty
officer (pay grade E-4 or E-5) . This is a 40 percent greater
rate of petty officer pay grade attainment than that for total
12

non-prior service (NPS) male high school diploma graduates
(HSDG) and a 63 percent greater petty officer pay grade
attainment than total NPS male accessions in the CY 1977
cohort.
TABLE 3
U.S. NAVY PAY GRADE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR CY77
NPS MALE ACCESSIONS ON ACTIVE DUTY 30 SEP 79
?av Grade HSDG Wk TOTAL
E-5 5 9 3
E-4 39 53 35
E-3 45 32 46
E-2 9 5 12
E-l 2 1 4
Total 100 100 100
Mean Pay
Grade
Achieved 3.3 3.6 3.2
SOURCE: Elster and Flyer
From these enlistee quality studies, two operall con-
clusions can be made. First, high school diploma graduate
enlistees are better than non-high school diploma graduate
enlistees in terms of their lower propensity to attrite from
the Navy and their better job performance. Second, high
quality enlistees are better than high school diploma gradu-
ate enlistees in general in terms of their lower propensity
to attrite from the Navy and their higher job performance.
13

C. SUPPLY LITERATURE REVIEW
This section presents a review of the literature on
enlistment supply models. While it is not exhaustive in
nature, it attempts to highlight the major enlistment supply
models. A very good comparison of the three major enlist-
ment supply models may be found in, "Department of Defense
and Navy Personnel Supply Models: Report of a Workshop."
1. The Rand Model
The model commonly referred to as the Rand model is
a result of Fernandez' work in, "Forecasting Enlisted Supply
Projections for 1979-1990." In his study, Fernandez
develops three enlistment supply models for Navy non-prior
service (NPS) male high school diploma graduates (HSDG)
.
One model was developed for Mental Categories I and II, a
second model was developed for Mental Category IIIA, and the
third model was developed for Mental Category IIIB.
The dependent variable in each model is the Navy
NPS male HSDG enlistment rate for the particular mental
categories analyze. As explanatory variables Fernandez
uses relative pay, the number of production recruiters, and
a youth unemployment rate. The relative pay variable was
defined as the average first year regular military compensa-
tion for enlistees with less than two years of service
divided by the average weekly earnings in the total private
economy. Unemployment was a lagged seasonally adjusted
unemployment rate for 16-19 year old males.
14

Quarterly observations on all variables from July
1970 through September 1978 were used in estimating the models
The data were fitted to a linear enlistment supply model.
The coefficients from the model estimations are presented in
Table 4. From Fernandez' study, the result of particular
interest is the imputed relative pay elasticity of .63 for
non-prior service male high school diploma graduates in mental
categories I and II (Fernandez) . This will be used for
comparison later in the supply determination chapter.
TABLE 4
FERNANDEZ ENLISTMENT SUPPLY MODEL RESULTS SUMMARY
2(Data are regression coefficients and R )
Mental Category




Relative Pay 14.61 -.30 4.52
Unemployment 49.56 29.12 27.83
R .880 .919 .914
SOURCE : Fernandez
2. The Duke Model
This model was developed by Morey at Duke University
and was first presented in "Budget Allocation and Enlistment
Prediction Models for the Navy's Recruiting Command: Testing
and Validation." Morey develops two separate enlistment
supply models, one for all Navy non-prior service (NPS) male
15

high school diploma graduates (HSDG) and a second enlistment
supply model for Navy NPS male HSDG's in Mental Categories
I-IIIA.
The dependent variable used was the number of Navy
enlistments for each respective group. Explanatory variables
included number of Navy recruiters, several advertising
variables measuring the impact of the various forms of
advertising, percent black, percent urban/rural, unemployment
rate, and a ratio of regular military compensation to average
first year civilian earnings. Monthly data on the variables
was used from January 1976 through September 1979 measured
in the 43 Navy recruiting districts, and the data were fitted
to a multiplicative model (Morey)
.
3. Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) Model
The CNA model was developed by Goldberg and presented
in "Recruiters, Advertising, and Navy Enlistments." In this
study, Goldberg estimates three enlistment supply models,
one for all non-prior service (NPS) male high school diploma
graduates (HSDG), a second for NPS male HSDG's in Mental
Categories I-IIIA, and a third model for NPS male HSDG's in
Mental Categories I and II.
Goldberg's basic model form is multiplicative with
NPS male HSDG contracts per population as the dependent
variable for each of the respective groups of mental cate-
gories. As explanatory variables, Goldberg uses relative
16

pay, unemployment, CETA expenditures per population
, a G.I.
Bill dummy variable, recruiters per population for each
service, 17-21 year old male population, and the percentage
of black in the population. Relative pay was defined as the
average full-time earnings of 18 year old civilian males
divided by first year's regular military compensation. The
unemployment rate used was that for all civilians. CETA
expenditures per population were represented by a youth
programs variable and a countercyclical programs variable.
Data analyzed by Goldberg were annual data on the
4 3 Navy recruiting districts from October 1975 through
September 1980. The results of Goldberg's analysis are
presented in Table 5. From Table 5, at the .01 confidence
level the variables that are consistently significant in
each of the models are: relative pay, unemployment, popula-
tion, Navy recruiters, and Air Force recruiters. This
result is consistent with the other models presented in this
chapter. The models form the basis of the methodology to be
presented in Chapter II.
1?er population refers to the 17-21 year old male popula-




GOLDBERG'S NPS MALE HSDG SUPPLY MODELS RESULTS SUMMARY
(Data are regression coefficients and R )
Mental Categories
Variable ALL** I-IIIA** I-II**
Constant 1.270 1.555 1.308
Relative Pay -0.915** -0.966** -0.949**
Unemployment 0.316** 0.258** 0.248**
Population 0.142** 0.195** 0.225**
Navy Recruiters 0.437** 0.466** 0.523**
Air Force Recruiters 0.462** 0.581** 0.573**
Army Recruiters 0.285** 0.224 0.243
Marine Recruiters -0.093** 0.024 0.073
Youth Programs -0.042 -0.138 -0.184*
Countercyclical
Programs -0.085** -0.085* -0.090*
% Black 0.007** 0.000 -0.002
G.I. Bill Dummy -0.004 -0.110** -0.099*
R .68 .72 .72
* Significant at the .05 level





In this chapter the method of determining the demand
and supply of high quality sailors will be presented. High
quality sailors are defined as those sailors who are in
Mental Category I or Mental Category II and are high school
degree graduates. Mental categories are defined in accord-
ance with Table 6 as a result of the enlistees percentile

















In addition, this chapter will present two alternative
wage policies for acquiring a required number of high quality





The determination of the U.S. Navy's historical demand
for high quality sailors is made up of two components,
stated policy and past practice. While policy and practice
should ideally be the same, inspection of both policy and
practice is required to fully understand the demand for high
quality sailors. Two dimensions of demand will be examined;
entry level and utilization.
1. Entrv Level
One dimension of demand can be inferred by examining
Navy policy statements and the proportion of high quality
sailors entering the Navy. The U.S. Navy stated policy
toward enlistment of high quality sailors will be extracted
from the Manpower Requirements Reports for the fiscal years
1976 to 1980 inclusive (MRR FY76-FY80)
.
The past practice component of entry level demand
will be measured by actual accession data. Accession data
for the period from October 1975 through September 1980
will be obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center.
The data will consist of information on all individuals who
signed enlistment contracts for the Navy in each of the
fiscal years 1976 through 1980 inclusive. Data will include
information on the education, mental category, race, and
sex of these accessions. These data will be utilized to
examine the practice of the Navy towards recruiting high




The second dimension of demand with which we are
concerned is the utilization of high quality sailors. This
will entail an examination of the distribution of high
quality sailors across occupational fields. Data extracted
from the Enlisted Active Duty Military Master and Loss and
Edit file maintained at the Defense Manpower Data Center in
Monterey, California, will be used to examine the past
practice of the U.S. Navy in the utilization of high quality
sailors. The data will consist of an occupational snapshot
of Navy personnel on 1 October of each year from 1975 through
1980, inclusive. For each Navy occupational rating, the
basic data will array personnel by length of service, mental
category, highest year of education, and race.
Some occupational data will be aggregated to facili-
tate the analysis. The apprenticeship ratings will be
grouped by apprenticeship field in accordance with Table 7.
Some of the Navy ratings have very few personnel;
by examining only high quality sailors, the number of sailors
in a given rating may be quite small. This necessitates
grouping ratings to increase sample size while maintaining
homogeneity of cells. A hybridization of the Navy Enlisted
Classification System will be selected to accomplish this
aggregation and is presented in Tables 8 and 9 (NEOCS) . The
hybridization entails a separation of those ratings which
have been identified as having a significant percentage of





































U.S. NAVY FOUR-YEAR OBLIGOR GROUPINGS
Occupational Fields Ratings
General Seamanship BM, SM
Ship Operations OS, QM
Marine Engineering BT , EN, GSM
Ship Maintenance HT, IM, MR, ML,
OM, PM, BR
Aviation Maintenance/Weapons PR, AE , AD, AZ
,



























BU, CE, CM, EA,
EO, SW, UT, EQ
DT, HM
LN, NC, PN, PC,
YN, RP
AK, DK, MS, SH,
SK










U.S. NAVY SIX-YEAR OBLIGOR GROUPINGS
Occupational Fields Rating
Marine Engineering EM, GSE, IC, MM
Aviation Maintenance/Weapons AQ, AT, AX





SOURCE: NEOCS, Recruiting Manual
Additionally, to facilitate data analysis, for each
rating there will be an aggregation of length of service
based upon normal enlistment lengths. The ratings, with the
exception of ratings which have a high percentage of six-year
obligors, will be aggregated in accordance with Table 10.
Since the six-year obligor group has, by definition, a signi-
ficant percentage of six-year initial enlistment contracts,
a separate aggregation scheme will be used, as presented in
Table 11. This aggregation is an attempt to capture the
effects of the longer initial enlistment contracts.
3. SUPPLY DETERMINATION
Two separate statistical models of sailor supply will be






















and Model #2 for high quality sailors. In each model/
accessions will be formulated as being determined by relative
pay, unemployment, the size of the population cohort, and
number of Navy recruiter man-years. The two models will be
25

developed by employing stepwise multiple regression analysis.
The two models will take the following form:
Model #1 HS = f(RELPAY, UNEM, POP, NREC)
Model #2 HQ = f(RELPAY, UNEM, POP, NREC)
where
,
HS = Number of non-prior service male high school graduate
enlistment contracts per 1000 of the 17-21 year old
population.
HQ = Number of non-prior service male Mental Categories
I and II high school degree graduate enlistment
contracts per 1000 of the 17-21 year old population.
RELPAY = Ratio of full-time earnings of 18 year old
civilian males to first year's RMC.
UNEM = Unemployment rate for all civilians.
POP = Number of 17-21 year olds in the population.
NREC = Number of Navy recruiter man years per 1000 of the
17-21 year old population.
The data collected on all variables are annual values
for each of the 4 3 Navy Recruiting Districts from October
1976 through September 1980, a total of 215 observations
which are listed in Appendix A. The data on the variables
in the supply model were made available by Lawrence Goldberg
at the Center for Naval Analyses. The data to be utilized
are a subset of the data set used by Goldberg in developing




1. The Dependent Variables
a. High School Sailor Enlistment Rate (HS)
This is the enlistment rate for all non-prior
service male enlistment contracts per 1000 of the 17-21 year
old population. The high school sailor model will be used
as the base case for comparison of alternative pay policies
to meet the Navy's demand for high quality sailors (215
observations - Navy recruiting district specific)
.
b. High Quality Sailor Enlistment Rate (HQ)
The high quality sailor enlistment rate is the
number of non-prior service Mental Categories I and II high
school degree graduate enlistment contracts per 1000 of the
17-21 year old population (215 observations—Navy recruiting
district specific) . This enlistment rate will be utilized
in building the model of Categories I and II HSDG's enlist-
ment supply behavior.
2. Predictors for Enlistment
a. Relative Pay (RELPAY)
Relative pay is the ratio of full-time earnings
of 18 year old civilian males divided by the first year's
Regular Military Compensation (215 observations—county data
mapped into Navy recruiting districts) . Regular Military
Compensation is composed of base pay, basic allowance for
quarters (BAQ), basic allowance for subsistence (BAS) , and
the tax advantage computed for the BAQ and BAS , as BAQ and
3AS are non-taxable. In tying the RMC to the civilian wages
27

by recruiting district, a measure of the relative financial
attractiveness of the military to the enlistee is obtained.
b. Unemployment (UNEM)
There are many measures of the unemployment rate
within the country. However, to chose among them is not
necessarily a crucial task. As demonstrated by Fernandez,
the youth unemployment rate and the all-civilian unemployment
rate are linearly dependent (Fernandez, 1979). In view of
this, the unemployment rate for all civilians within each
recruiting district was selected for this study (215 observa-
tions based upon closest city to the Navy recruiting district)
.
c. Population (POP)
Since the 17-21 year old population pool is the
source of the majority of the Navy's non-prior service en-
listment contracts, the population of this age cohort will
be used as the population variable in the enlistment supply
equations (215 observations—Navy recruiting district specific)
d. Recruiters (NREC)
Recruiting effort has been previously demonstrated
to be an important factor in determining enlistment supply
behavior in the U.S. Navy (Fernandez, 1979; Goldberg, 1975,
March and May, 1980; :iorey, 1977). In this study, the number
of Navy recruiter man-years per 1000 of the 17-21 year old
population per recruiting district will be used to capture
the effect of the recruiting effort (215 observations
—
recruiting district specific) . While it is recognized that
28

there are spillover effects from other services' recruiters,
this effect was found to be small (Goldberg, 1980) , and will
not be included in the model as a separate explanatory variable
In earlier studies by Goldberg (Goldberg, 1975)
,
it was demonstrated that advertising levels can affect en-
listment behavior. Advertising effects will not be included
in the riiodel as an explanatory variable; these data are not
readily available by recruiting district. Depending upon the
advertising medium employed, there can be a great deal of
overlapping coverage between some Navy Recruiting Districts.
Additionally, in later studies by Goldberg, he has dropped
the advertising variable from his models of enlistment
supply behavior (Goldberg, 1980)
.
3. Modeling Considerations
The enlistment supply models developed will be used
to generate two important outputs; the individual regression
coefficients of the independent variables, and the elastici-
ties of the independent variables. The coefficients are
important because they show the magnitude and direction of
the relationship between the dependent variable and explana-
tory variables. The elasticities are important in computing
the percentage amount and direction of effect upon the de-
pendent variable from a percent increase or decrease in one
of the explanatory variables. The coefficients and elastici-
ties are also important in assessing behavioral conformance
29

of the model to theoretical considerations of the relationship
between the dependent and explanatory variables.
In particular, these models will be used to focus
upon the effects of changes in relative pay. This necessi-
tates performance of tests of the individual coefficients
to ensure they are not equal to zero. Additionally, there
must be confidence intervals constructed for the coefficients
and for the elasticity values.
Since this model will be constructed using a combina-
tion of cross-sectional and time series data, there is a
possibility of functional dependency among the dependent
variables. Therefore, a test for collinearity among the
explanatory variables will be undertaken. Other forms of
dependency will be examined through the use of standard
autocorrelation tests.
C. PAY POLICY DETERMINATION
In Chapter V the knowledge gained from the demand
determination and supply determination chapters will be put
together to examine two alternative pay systems for accessing
the requisite quality mix of sailors into the Navy. The
first pay system will be a uniform pay system under which
high quality enlistees are paid more than other enlistees.
Under both of these systems the level of pay will be increased




The total cost of enlistees for the first year of service
will be calculated under the uniform pay system. A second
total cost of enlistees for the first year of service will
be calculated using a two-tier pay system. By subtracting
the cost of the two-tier pay system from the cost of the uni-
form pay system, the amount of economic rent paid to those
sailors who do not meet the high quality sailor standard can
be estimated. This amount of economic rent will be used as
a measure of the inefficiency of the uniform pay system in
meeting the quality requirements of the all-volunteer Navy.
The thesis concludes with a study summary and further




The Navy's demand for high quality sailors can be con-
sidered from two dimensions: the quantity of high quality
sailors demanded as entry level personnel, and the quantity
of high quality sailors utilized in different occupations.
This chapter will provide empirical measures of both dimen-
sions of demand.
A. ENTRY LEVEL
In this section we present both the Navy's stated acces-
sioning policies for high school diploma sailors and data
on the actual past accessions of high quality sailors. The
Navy's accession policy is extracted from the Manpower
Requirements Reports (MRR) for FY 1976 through FY 1980.
These requirements are summarized in Table 12.
TABLE 12
NAVY MALE NPS ACCESSION GOALS
Accession HSDG Accession




1976T 28,135 76 21,383
1977 86,480 76 51,888
1978 64,392 76 48,938
1979 59,059 76 44,885




From Table 12 it can be seen that from 1976 through 1980
the Navy had a goal that 76 percent of male accessions would
be high school diploma graduates. However, in FY 1981 there
was a change in Navy policy. The Navy now defines its
accession quality goal in terms of mental categories as
stated in the Manpower Requirements Report for Fiscal Year
1981 (MRR 1981)
.
"In FY 1979, 76.1 percent of all non-prior service
accessions were high school diploma graduates. In
order to obtain a better balance between require-
ments and manpower supply, the Navy implemented a
revised recruiting policy on 1 Oct 79. The Navy's
former policy required 76.0 percent of male non-
prior service accessions to be high school diploma
graduates. Under the revised policy 74 percent of
male non-prior service accessions must be in Mental
Groups I/III Upper. This policy provides a better
match between manpower supply and Navy requirements
than did previous policy. It is expected that
72 percent of FY 1980 male non-prior service acces-
sions will be high school diploma graduates."
(MRR FY81)
To determine the Navy's practice with regard to quality
standards for entry level personnel, accession data provided
by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) were examined.
Table 13 contains data on the number of non-prior service
(NPS) personnel in Mental Categories I and II accessed into
the Navy in three education categories: GED, high school
diploma graduates, and those with education beyond their high
school diploma. The data are presented for each fiscal year
from FY 1976 (1 Oct 75 - 30 Sep 76) through FY 1981. In
FY 1976, 1,978 (6.2%) of the NPS Mental Category I and II
males were GED's, while 28,536 (89.5%) were High School
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Diploma Graduates, and 1,379 (4.3%) had completed at least
some college education.
TABLE 13
NAVY MALE NPS MENTAL GROUPS I AND II ACCESSIONS
FY GED HSDG Some College
1976 1,978 (6.2) 28,536 (89.5) 1,379 (4.3)
1977 1,474 (5.2) 26,658 (90.3) 1,271 (4.5)
1978 1,958 (8.6) 17,247 (75.7) 3,576 (15.7)
1979 1,656 (8.4) 15,589 (79.1) 2,452 (12.5)
1980 2,618 (11.0) 18,561 (78.3) 2,530 (10.7)
1981 3,069 (11.4) 20,869 (75.6) 2,962 (11.0)
SOURCE: Author
In Table 14 the data are aggregated to yield the total
number of high quality accessions and the percentage high
quality accessions were of NPS male accessions for FY 1976
through FY 1981. The cost of combining General Educational
Development (GED) certificate holders with high school
diploma graduates is that the two groups having somewhat
different average performances (e.g., attrition rates) in
the military were thereby aggregated. However, because the
investigator was unable to separate GED certificate holders
from high school diploma graduates in all the data, for data
capability, GED ' s were aggregated with high school diploma
graduates. For example, in FY 1976 there were 31,893 high
quality accessions, which was 35.6 percent of the total NPS
male accessions. (Those in Mental Category I or II with a
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GED are classified as high quality sailors for data compati-
bility between the entry level data and the utilization data)
The data concerning mental group categorization have been
renormed to correct the misnorming problem which occurred in
the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)
.
TABLE 14











A second dimension of the Navy's demand for high quality
sailors is their utilization within the Navy. Data on Navy
utilization of high quality sailors came from the Enlisted
Master Record Loss and Edit File at the DMDC. The data
examined contained some missing elements which prevented
some individuals from being classified into the proper race
or the proper mental group. In all cases of missing data
elements, the individual was omitted from analysis. This
omission policy did not bias the results to the extent the
missing data was distributed the same as the data remaining
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for analysis. In no case did the missing data amount to more
than 19 percent of the group analyzed and, in general, was
less than 10 percent.
Table 15 presents a summary of the education and mental
group attainment of the inventory of enlisted males in the
Navy on 31 March 1981. HSDG's (including GED's) constitute
8 6.8 percent of the males in the Navy on that date. Just
over 45 percent of these HSDG's were classified as high
quality, while 39.8 percent of the total males in the Navy
were classified as high quality.
TABLE 15
ENLISTED MALES IN THE NAVY
% HQ 39.8
% HSDG 86.8
% HQ of HSDG 45.8
SOURCE: Author
An occupational analysis of the utilization of high quality
personnel was accomplished using the NEOCS study (ref NEOCS)
groupings for ratings partitioned into either six-year obligor
or four-year obligor groups. A separate grouping was utilized
for apprenticeship ratings. The results for the four-year
obligor grouping are presented in Table 16. Table 16 presents
data on the twenty-three occupational groups. The occupational
grouping with the lowest proportion of high quality sailors




NAVY iiNLISTED MALES>—FOUR-YE:ar obligOR RATINGS





General Seamanship 11,971 74.5 18.3 13.9
Ship Operations 11,683 87.2 46.3 40.4
Marine Engineering 21,117 77.8 30.5 23.7
Ship Maintenance 14,582 85.0 32.4 27.5
Aviation Maintenance/
Weapons 45,848 85.5 27.5 23.5
Air Ground Support 8,758 82.0 20.6 16.9
Air Traffic Control 2,056 94.7 61.9 58.6
Ordnance Systems 11,233 82.7 34.9 28.9
Sensor Operations 3,063 95.6 67.3 64.3
Weapons System Support 1,588 94.5 69.9 66.1
Data Systems 2,808 95.9 55.4 53.1
Construction 10,442 90.1 29.0 26.1
Health Care 14,987 96.1 46.7 44.9
Administration 17,222 91.3 30.4 27.8
Logistics 34,784 84.7 15.0 12.7
Media 3,297 95.1 51.5 49.0
Musician 675 98.4 57.2 56.3
Master-at-Arms 1,163 87.5 24.9 21.8
Crypto logy 5,666 95.9 51.5 49.4
Communications 13,246 91.4 32.1 29.3
Intelligence 915 96.2 53. 3 51.3
Meteorology 1,343 93.4 64.5 60.2
Aviation Sensor Operations 3,001 91.3 63.6 58.1




classified as high quality. The Weapons System Support group
had the highest proportion of high quality sailors with 66.1
percent. As can be seen from Table 16 there is a substantial
variation in the occupational percentages of high quality
sailors around the four-year obligor average of 27.8 percent
high quality personnel.
The six-year obligor grouping utilizing the NEOCS study
is presented in Table 17. The six year obligor group has a
relatively small variation around the group average of 72.8
percent high quality sailors. The six-year obligor group
with the lowest percentage of high quality sailors was the
marine engineering group. There were 40,123 males in this
rating group, with 9 3.2 percent possessing a high school
diploma (including GED's). In the Marine Engineering group,
67.6 percent of the HSDG's were classified as high quality,
while these high quality sailors comprised 62.9 percent of
the males in the rating group.
TABLE 17













N %HSDG % HQ of HSDG % HQ of Group
40,123 93.2 67.5 62.9
12,190 95.1 79.8 75.8
22,741 98.1 86.8 85.1
2,033 98.1 81.6 80.0
7,145 94.8 78.5 74.4
7,375 98.7 81.9 80.8
1,729 99.1 84.8 84.0
88,336 95.2 76.3 72.6

It is interesting to note that the six year marine
engineering group had a greater percentage of high quality
sailors than all but two of the twenty-three occupational
groupings for the four year obligors. For the total of all
six-year obligor ratings, 72.6 percent of the sailors in
these ratings were high quality sailors. Proportionately,
more than twice as many of the six-year obligors were high
quality sailors than was true of four-year obligors. As will
be shown later in this chapter, six-year obligor ratings are
preponderantly highly technical.
Since the NEOCS study did not include the Apprenticeship
ratings, the Apprenticeship ratings partitioned into six
groupings are presented in Table 18. In Table 18 for the
Apprenticeship groups, the Dentalman group possessed the
lowest percentage of high quality sailors with 16.5 percent.
The Hospitalman group possessed the highest percentage, with
30.1 percent of them being classified as high quality.
TABLE 18
NAVY ENLISTED MALES—APPRENTICESHIP RATINGS
Rating N % HSDG % HQ of HSDG % HQ of Rating
Airman 21,088 77.8 28.1 21.9
Constructionman 365 86.7 31.6 27.4
Dentalman 623 91.3 18.1 16.5
Fireman 21,350 76.1 27.6 21.0
Hospitalman 5,625 89.5 33.7 30.1
Seaman 47,137 80.9 37.1 26.2




To gain further insight into the occupational utilization
of high quality sailors, a separate partitioning of the Navy
ratings can be done by grouping the ratings according to the
technical skill level required. (See Appendix A for a list of
the ratings in each group.) This grouping is presented in
Table 19. In Table 19 for the semi-technical group, there
were 76,213 males in the group, with 82.3 percent possessing
a high school diploma (including GED's). Of the HSDG's,
26.2 percent were classified as high quality, while these
high quality sailors comprised 21.6 percent of the males in
the rating group. By contrast, 75.2 percent of the 59,120
sailors in highly technical occupations were high quality
sailors. The majority of sailors are in ratings categorized
as technical, with 4 3.1 percent of them being high quality
personnel
.
The technical grouping of the Navy ratings does not
include the Apprenticeship ratings. As indicated in
Table 19, 44 percent of the sailors in other than apprentice-
ship ratings are high quality sailors. This can be compared
with the 2 6.2 percent of apprentices who are high quality
sailors as shown in Table 13.
To gain a longitudinal perspective on the utilization
of high quality sailors, a partitioning of the Navy enlisted
males by length of service (LOS) is presented in Table 20.
From Table 20, the percentage of HSDG in each length of
service group is monotonically increasing until the first
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retirement opportunity at 20 years of service. The percentage
of high quality sailors in these length of service groups
increases through the 5-8 year group, and is then monotonically
decreasing.
TABLE 19


















NAVY ENLISTED iMALES BY LOS
LOS (in years) N % HSDG % HQ of HSDG % HQ
0-4 240,884 84.4 41.1 34.7
5-8 71,489 90.1 55.0 49.6
9-12 33,501 91.2 52.0 47.4
13-20 38,461 92.2 50.3 46.8
21 + 9,291 89.2 49.0 43.7
SOURCE: Author
To further increase our understanding of longitudinal utiliza-
tion of high quality sailors, we disaggregate the Navy enlisted
males by length of service and by technical group. Also shown
in Table 21, the percentage of high quality sailors for the
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semi-technical group stays around 2 percent, with no discern-
ible pattern over length of service. In the technical and
highly-technical rating groups, there is a noticeable increase
in percentage of high quality sailors from the 0-4 year length
of service to the first retirement opportunity at 20 years of
service.
The reader is cautioned in making conclusions about the
data presented in Tables 20 and 21 since these are cross-
sectional data on Navy enlisted males, and not cohort data.
Appendix B contains a listing of high quality percentages by
rating by length of service. The next chapter will present
the enlistment supply models which result from the analysis
of the supply data.
TABLE 21
% HIGH QUALITY NAVY ENLISTED xMALES BY LOS
BY SEMI-TECHNICAL, TECHNICAL AND HIGHLY TECHNICAL GROUPINGS
LOS Semi- Highly-
(in vears) Technical Technical Technical
0-4 22.3 38.6 69.3
5-8 21.7 47.5 79.2
9-12 23.5 48.5 78.9
13-20 18.0 49.7 84.2





In this chapter the High School Diploma Graduate Enlist-
ment Model and the High Quality Enlistment Model will be
presented. They are both the result of stepwise linear
regression.
Before attempting to fit the data to any model, a test
of functional dependency among the explanatory variables wa
performed. The test was one of computing the condition
number of the explanatory variables matrix. The condition
number was 547, indicating no significant functional
dependency among the explanatory variables (Dahlquist and
Bjorck; Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch) . For a listing of the
data utilized, the reader is referred to Appendix C.
A. THE SUPPLY MODELS
Several functional forms were attempted using the four
explanatory variables: relative pay (RELPAY) , unemployment
rate (UNEM) number of Navy recruiters (NREC) , and population
(POP) , in an effort to obtain a "good" fit. These models
included linear, multiplicative, and logistic forms.
1 . Linear Model
Table 22 is a presentation of the results of fitting
the data to a linear model. The dependent variable in each
model was the number of enlistments by recruiting district
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for high school diploma graduate enlistments and for high
quality enlistments, respectively. In both the high school
diploma graduate enlistment model and the high quality
enlistment model, the results, using an F-test, were found
to be significant at the .001 level. Additionally, each of
the coefficients of the explanatory variables were found to
be significant at the .001 level utilizing an F-test.
2The goodness of fit criterion was based upon R adjusted
for the degrees of freedom in the overall model. These two
2
models had an adjusted R of .806 for the high school diploma
graduate enlistment model and .750 for the high quality en-
2listment model. The adjusted R for these linear models were










Total Equation F 222.75** 161.52**
Adjusted RZ .806 .750
Durbin-W£itson 1.71* 1.69*
* significant at the .01 level




The Durbin-Watson test was used to test for first-
order autocorrelation among the explanatory variables. For
both models the Durbin-Watson test showed no first-order




The results of the multiplicative models are presented
in Table 23. In these models the dependent variable is the
enlistment rate for high school diploma graduate sailors and
the enlistment rate for high quality sailors. Performing an
F-test on these two models, the results were found to be
significant at the .001 level. The individual coefficients
of each of the explanatory variables were also tested using
an F-test. All of the coefficients in the high school diploma
graduate enlistment model were found to be significant at the
.001 level. In using an F-test of the coefficients in the
high quality enlistment model, all of the coefficients were
found to be significant at the .001 level.
2
The adjusted R was .819 for the high school diploma
graduate enlistment model and .757 for the high quality en-
listment model. In testing for first-order autocorrelation,
the Durbin-Watson test statistic was in the inconclusive
range for both enlistment models.
3. Logistic Model
The final two models to be presented are of the
logistic form. In these models the population variable was

















Adjusted RZ .819 .757
Durbin-Watson 1.63 1.57
** significant at the .001 level
SOURCE: Author
district into an enlistment rate by Navy recruiting district,
The assumption here is that enlistment rates are not a
function of the size of the population eligible to enlist in
the Navy.
Table 2 4 presents the results of the logistic model
regressions. These results were found to be significant for
the high school diploma graduate enlistment model and the
high quality enlistement model at the .001 level, using an
F-test. Additionally, using an F-test, the coefficients of
all three explanatory variables in both models were found
to be significant at the .001 level.
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2The adjusted R for the high school diploma graduate
enlistment model was .551, and for the high quality enlistment
model it was .486. These adjusted R2 • s are both nearly the
2same as the adjusted R ' s for the two multiplicative models
developed. The results of the Durbin-Watson test found both














Adjusted R2 .551 .486
Durbin-Watson 1.71* 1.66*
* significant at the . 01 level
**significant at the .001 level
SOURCE : Author
B. RELATIVE PAY ELASTICITIES OF THE SUPPLY MODELS
Relative pay elasticities for all of the models developed
are presented in Table 25. These elasticities were calculated
using the average values of all observations on the variables.
While the relative pay elasticities appear to be signed
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improperly, this is not the case, since relative pay was
defined as the civilian pay variable divided by the military
pay variable. It is important to note the importance of the
functional form when calculating the relative pay elastici-
ties. Although the same data base is used, the relative pay
elasticity from the high school diploma models range from
.815 to .956, while the relative pay elasticity for the high
quality enlistment models is between .602 and .751.
TABLE 25
RELATIVE PAY ELASTICITIES





For all three functional forms of the enlistment models,
the absolute values of the relative pay elasticity of the
high school diploma graduate enlistment model are larger
than the absolute values of the relative pay elasticity of
the high quality enlistment model. This indicates that a
larger percentage increase in military pay relative to
civilian pay is required to obtain the same percentage
increase in high quality enlistments as compared to high
school diploma graduate enlistments.
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These elasticities, although larger in magnitude, confirm
the relative ranking of Morey's relative pay elasticities.
Morey obtained relative pay elasticities of .179 and .025 for
high school diploma graduate enlistees and upper-mental group
(I-IIIA) high school diploma graduate enlistees, respectively
(Morey)
.
The elasticities do, however, conflict with those
obtained by Goldberg in his recent studies. Goldberg calcu-
lated relative pay elasticities to be -.915 and -.949 for
high school diploma graduate enlistees and high quality en-
listees, respectively. Since Goldberg calculated the absolute
value of the relative pay elasticity for high quality enlist-
ments to be greater than the absolute value of the relative
pay elasticity for high school diploma graduate enlistments,
this means that the high quality enlistments are slightly more
responsive to a given change in the relative pay than are high
school diploma graduate enlistments. This result is probably
due to Goldberg's use of an unusual, non-standard functional
form and the use of a greater number of explanatory variables.
Goldberg's model may be good for predictive purposes but is
poor for measurement of individual effects. A summary of the
pay elasticities from various studies is presented in Table 26
to facilitate comparison.
In this study, the high school diploma graduate enlistments
were much more responsive to an increase in military pay than
were high quality enlistments. Using the ratio of HSDG rela-
tive pay elasticity, for each functional form, the HSDG
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enlistees were 37 to 48 percent more responsive to a military
pay increase than were the HQ enlistees.
TABLE 2 6




Goldberg (b) -.92 -.95







The next chapter will utilize the results of this supply





V. AN APPLICATION OF THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY ANALYSES
This chapter will present an application of the demand
and supply analysis to evaluate alternative policies for
obtaining a desired increase in total high school diploma
graduate (HSDG) enlistees. For the purposes of this analysis,
the multiplicative enlistment supply models have been
selected.
In selecting the functional form of the enlistment supply
2
model to be used for this application, R was not used as a
model selection criterion. The logistic enlistment supply
mdoels predict an enlistment rate, while the linear and
multiplicative enlistment supply models predict the number
of enlistments. This presents a scaling problem in the
dependent variable and does not allow for a direct comparison
2
of the adjusted R ' s. The logistic enlistment supply models
were transformed mathematically to allow for prediction of
the number of enlistments. The transformed models were then
used with the observations on the explanatory variables to
obtain predicted values for the dependent variables. From
these predicted values and the observed values of the dependent
variables, new adjusted R 's were calculated. This resulted
in an R2 of .842 for the logistic high school diploma
graduate enlistment supply model and .773 for the logistic
high quality enlistment supply model. These new adjusted
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2 oR 'a are presented in Table 27 with the adjusted R ' s from









2The R 's presented in Table 1 are directly comparable,
since they were all calculated for models predicting the same
dependent variable. Because of the small difference in these
2 2
adjusted R ' s, adjusted R was not used as a criterion for
choosing amongst the model functional forms.
The multiplicative enlistment supply models were selected
because they have several properties which make them more
desirable than the other enlistment supply model functional
forms. First, for the high school enlistment supply models
and the high quality enlistment supply models, the absolute
value of the relative pay elasticity from the multiplicative
functional form is the largest. Using the multiplicative
model to derive the change in military pay necessary to
achieve a given increase in enlistments would result in an
understatement of the military pay increase necessary should
one of the other functional forms be more correct. Second,
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the difference between the relative pay elasticity for the
high school diploma graduate enlistment supply model and the
relative pay elasticity for the high quality enlistment
supply model is smallest in the multiplicative enlistment
supply models. Using the multiplicative models when one of
the other forms is correct results in an understatement of
the differences in the effect of a change in military pay on
high quality enlistees as opposed to high school diploma
enlistees. Finally, the multiplicative enlistment supply
models are simple. The elasticity with respect to enlist-
ments of each explanatory variable is given by the respective
exponent of the explanatory variable. The elasticities for
the multiplicative form from Table 2 5 in Chapter IV are
constant, not varying with factor levels of the explanatory
variables
.
A. UNIFORM PAY SYSTEM
The usefulness of the high quality enlistment model may
be demonstrated by the following example. Table 28 presents
the data on male NPS enlistees for Fiscal Year 1980.
TABLE 28





SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center
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Assume the Navy increased demand for high school diploma
graduate enlistments by 10,000 from the base number of en-
listees from 1980. The additional 10,000 high school
diploma graduate enlistees represent a 16.3 percent increase
from the 61,340 enlistees in the base year (10,000/61,340 =
16.3%) .
The change in relative pay necessary to obtain a 16.3%
increase in high school diploma graduate enlistees is given
by
change in % change in enlistment requirements




Using the average relative pay ratio of .939 for the 43
remaining districts in the base year of 1980, the change in
military pay necessary to achieve a 17.1 percent change in
relative civilian pay is given by
change in change in relative pay




Thus, the application of the high school diploma graduate
supply model leads us to conclude that 18.2 percent increase
in military pay would yield a 10,000 person increase in high
school diploma graduate enlistees.
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However, this analysis is flawed. Since the pay elasticity
for high quality enlistees is smaller than the pay elasticity
of the high school diploma graduate enlistees, the pay change
will result in a smaller percentage increase in high quality
enlistees. More precisely, the high quality pay elasticity
is only 78.6 percent (HQ elasticity/HSDG elasticity = .751/. 956
.786) of the high school diploma graduate pay elasticity. The
quality mix of 1980 HSDG enlistments was 38.6 percent high
quality enlistees (i.e., 1980 HQ/1980 HSDG = 23,704/61,340 =
.386). To maintain the quality mix, we want 3,860 of the
increased 10,000 high school diploma graduate enlistees to be
high quality enlistees. Instead, the military pay change of
18.2 percent would only yield 3,034 (.786 x 3,860) high quality
enlistees
.
Thus, continued application of the high school diploma
graduate model to calculate military pay changes needed to
accomplish desired goals of high school diploma graduate
enlistees will fail to produce the proper quality mix of
enlistees. In particular, this procedure would lead to a
decreasing proportion of high quality enlistees.
There are several remedies to this deficiency. One is
to raise military pay the amount necessary to attract the
desired quantity of high quality enlistees. In the example
above, this means deriving the military pay change necessary
to attract 16.3 percent more high quality enlistees.
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The change in relative pay necessary to obtain a 16.3
percent increase in high quality enlistees is given by
change in
_
% change in enlistment requirements




The change in military pay necessary to achieve a 21.7
percent change in relative pay is given by
change in
_ % change in relative pay




The application of the high quality supply model leads
us to conclude that a 2 3.1 percent increase in military pay
is necessary to maintain the base proportion of high quality
enlistees, i.e., to obtain 3,860 additional high quality
enlistees. Since this is greater than the 18.2 percent
increase derived from the high school diploma graduate
supply model, it would also yield an oversupply of high
school diploma graduates.
The resultant oversupply of high school diploma graduate
enlistees means that the high school diploma graduate enlistees
will be paid more than is necessary to enlist them. This
result will always occur when a uniform pay system is used
to generate the desired number of high quality recruits.
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B. TWO-TIER PAY SYSTEM
Alternatively, the supply models can be used to determine
the military pay necessary under a two-tier pay system to
attract the desired increase in both high school diploma
graduate and high quality enlistees. This would entail
paying the high school diploma graduate enlistees 18.2 percent
more than in 1980 and paying the high quality enlistees 23.1
percent more than in 1980.
In terms of total pay to enlistees, the two-tier pay
system would result in a lower cost method of obtaining the
desired proportion of high quality enlistees. Using the
resular military compensation level for the first year of
enlistment from 1980 was $8,175 (Goldberg, 1981). The high
quality supply model under a single pay system implies a
23.1 percent increase in pay necessary to maintain the
desired proportion of high quality enlistees. Therefore,
the total pay to enlistees would be given by
Total,
(
Total HSDG and increase) x <"!")
pay HQ enlistees v J RMC
= 71,340 x 1.231 x $8,175
= $717.9 million
Under a two-tier pay system, the high school diploma
graduate enlistments are paid the 18.2% increment in pay
required to enlist them and high quality enlistees are
paid the 23.1% increment necessary to enlist their required
amount. The total cost of enlistees in the first year of
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service after enlistment is the sum of these two amounts.
Using the results from both supply models with a two-tier pay
system, the total pay to enlistees would be given by
Total u HSDG HSDG pay 1980 HQ .
pay enlistees' increase' * RMC ; ^enlistees'
(
HQ pay 1980,
x u increase ; x ( RMC ;
= (37,636 x 1.182 x $8,175) + (23,704 x 1.231 x $8,175;
= $602.2 million
The amount of economic rent paid to the high school diploma
graduate enlistees as a result of continuing the uniform pay
policy is given by
$717.9 million - $602.2 million = $115.7 million.
The $115.7 million is a lower limit on the amount of
economic rent, in that it considers only male high school
diploma graduate enlistees and male high quality enlistments.
Women and those who do not possess a high school diploma
would also have to be added into the calculations to obtain
a more accurate estimate of the economic rent under the
current pay system. The next chapter will present the






This study examined two groups of Navy non-prior service
male enlistments; high school diploma graduate enlistments
in all mental categories and high school diploma graduate
enlistments in Mental Categories I and II. The latter group
was defined to be "high quality" enlistees. A rationale for
interest in high quality enlistments was presented. An em-
pirical analysis of the Navy's demand for high quality en-
listees was accomplished using the Enlisted Active Duty
Military Master and Loss and Edit File.
Several supply models of high school diploma graduate
enlistments and of high quality enlistments were developed
using data furnished by Lawrence Goldberg from the Center
for Naval Analyses. Of these, the muliplicative enlistment
supply models were then used to examine alternative pay
systems assuming an increasing requirement for enlistees
into the Navy.
In the application of the enlistment supply models to
derive military pay changes necessary to satisfy an increased
demand for high school diploma graduate enlistees it was
discovered that resultant policy would guarantee a decreasing
quality mix of enlistees. This is because of the different
pay elasticities for high quality enlistees vis-a-vis high
59

school diploma graduate enlistees. High quality enlistments
were shown to be about 7 8 percent as responsive to military
pay increases as were high school diploma graduate enlistments.
This result implies that a two-tier pay system would be more
efficient if the Navy were to attempt to maintain a desired
quality mix while increasing the number of enlistees required.
Under a two-tier pay system the high quality enlistees would
be paid more than the high school diploma graduate enlistees.
This two-tier pay system would also result in a savings of
$115.7 million to the Navy under a scenario of 10,000 increased
demand for high school diploma graduate enlistees and a
maintenance of a constant quality mix.
Currently the "Navy pays $2000 extra to those willing to
learn nuclear skills or how to be boiler technicians (Fialka) .
"
The analysis accomplished for this thesis did not include a
specific look at nuclear versus non-nuclear skills. However,
to the extent that the nuclear skills are classified as six-
year obligor ratings (due to the additional time required for
nuclear power training) , the Navy may already be paying
enlistees based upon their quality. The six-year obligor
ratings on average possessed 72.6 percent high quality
sailors are more productive than other sailors independent
of the occupation to which they are assigned, then perhaps
bonuses should be based upon input characteristics.
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3, AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The first area for further research is to test the models
developed in this study with Fiscal Year 1981 data. The pre-
dicted numbers of 1981 high school diploma graduate enlistees
and 1981 high quality enlistees using the models developed in
this thesis can be compared to the actual numbers of 1981 high
school diploma graduate enlistees and high quality enlistees.
A projected quality mix of enlistees can also be predicted
and compared to the actual quality mix of Fiscal Year 1981
enlistees.
A second area for further research involves identifying
and removing the GED certificate holders from the high
quality category, inasmuch as their attrition rate is not
quite as good as the attrition rates for high school diploma
graduate enlistees (Elster)
.
A third area for further research involves providing a
better empirical foundation for the models. In particular,
we need to develop a better understanding of the effects of
unemployment and the interrelationships among the explanatory
variables. More work needs to be undertaken on development
of supply models for separate racial and gender groupings.
Finally, additional work in the area of sailor productivity
is needed. Research needs to be done on the relationship of
entry characteristics such as Categories I and II HSDG to
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U.S. NAVY RATINGS BY LOS
Those ratings annotated with an * are classified as six-
year obligor ratings and are grouped by LOS according to
Table 11 in Chapter III. All other ratings are grouped by
LOS according to Table 10 in Chapter III.
AVIATION BOATSWAIN'S MATE (AB)






LAUNCHING AND RECOVERY (ABE)































AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER (AC)



















AVIATION ELECTRICIAN'S MATE (AE)
































AVIATION STRUCTURAL MECHANIC (AM)













































AVIATION FIRE CONTROL TECHNICIAN (AQ)
*









AVIATION SUPPORT EQUIPMENT TECHNICIAN (AS)






AVIATION SUPPORT EQUIPMENT TECHNICIAN-
ELECTRICAL (ASE)








AVIATION SUPPORT EQUIPMENT TECHNICIAN-
HYDRAULIC AND STRUCTURES (ASH)






AVIATION SUPPORT EQUIPMENT TECHNICIAN-
MECHANICAL (ASM)









AVIATION ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN (AT)
*














AVIATION ASW OPERATOR (AW)







AVIATION ASW TECHNICIAN (AX)
*









AVIATION MAINTENANCE ADMINISTRATIONMAN (AZ)


































































































































Total I' 766 21 * 6

ILLUSTRATOR DRAFTSMAN (DM)







DATA PROCESSING TECHNICIAN (DP!









DATA SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN (DS)
*




































































ELECTRONIC WARFARE TECHNICIAN (EW)







FIRE CONTROL TECHNICIAN (FT)
*








BALLISTIC MISSILE FIRE CONTROL (FTB)
*








GUN FIRE CONTROL (FTG)
*











SURFACE MISSILE FIRE CONTROL (FTM)
*








































GAS. TURBINE SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN (GS)






GAS TURBINE SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN-
ELECTRICAL (GSE)*







GAS TURBINE SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN-
MECHANICAL (GSM)

































INTERIOR COMMUNICATION TECHNICIAN (IC)*


































































































MESS MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST (MS)





















































OCEAN SYSTEMS TECHNICIAN (OT)


















































AIRCREW SURVIVAL EQUIPMENTMAN (PR)











































































































































This appendix is a listing of the logarithms of the
215 observations on the dependent and explanatory variables
used in this study.
HSDG HQ RELPAY UNEM POP NREC
2.,13681 1.,38310 -0.,217417 2.,06686 5.,56484 1. 57085
2.,03014 1.,23453 -0.,161236 2.,16332 5.,9584 1.,14656
2. 25275 1.,58807 -0.,353313 2.,42480 5.,46638 1.,65001
1.,71738 0.,795299 -0.,220031 2.,34181 6.,07579 1.,01761
2. 04067 1.,24763 -0.,324810 1. 80829 5.,20284 1.,24129
1.,93407 1.,04083 -0.,247993 2.,16332 5.,61975 1. 21221
2.,01184 1. 01306 -0.,205650 2.,27213 5.,46237 1.,38031
1.,89094 0.,866251 -0.,309044 2.,06686 5.,17638 1.,35304
1. 57548 0.,660304 -0.,298606 1.,75786 5.,22580 1.,07865
2.,18601 1.,43752 -0.,434703 1.,98787 5.,05320 1. 34539
1.,64140 0.,543843 -0.,338076 2.,04122 5.,21190 1.,07596
2.,15826 1.,35714 -0.,329472 2.,41591 5.,28012 1.,16719
2.,00776 1.,01074 -0.,264094 1.,70475 5.,18367 1.,26838
1.,70591 0.,743269 -0.,292959 1.,90211 5.,32052 1. 02862
1.,66011 0.,631396 -0.,350327 1.,54756 5.,68396 0,,903588
2.,06781 1.,28838 -0.,115876 1.,91692 5.,45568 1.,62351
2.,21221 1.,37641 -0.,176658 1 , 94591 5.,56768 1.,42166
2.,22682 1.,32018 -0.,079435 2.,40695 6.,00694 1.,30227
2.,04167 1.,20305 -0.,123453 1..60944 5.,12845 1.,50486
1.,67868 0.,690814 -0.,193850 2.,10413 5.,31800 1.,23593
2.,09735 1.,24837 -0.,256283 2.,06686 5.,27666 1.,49069
1.,54053 0.,488917 -0.,329862 1.,38629 5.,32222 1.,11072
1.,81439 1.,02616 -0.,232146 2.,06686 5..64840 1.,19108
1.,79585 0.,845974 -0.,047795 2.,04122 5,,84859 1.,57558
1..89460 1.,11247 -0..143297 1.,98787 5,.40520 1.,40824
1..72217 0,.973577 -0,.275098 1.,90211 5,.29174 1.,32030
2,.06082 1,.37909 -0,.201530 1,.85630 5,.29673 1.,71087
1,.84559 1,.14904 -0,.193850 2,.10413 5..22768 1.,25389
1,.74031 1,.02492 -0,.056501 1..60944 5,.47787 1.,00217
1,.90337 1,.16270 -0,.095330 1,.82455 5..29407 1..42736
2,.12212 1..12654 -0,.220206 2,.00148 4,.97378 1.,38925
L,.83760 1..03436 -0,.067677 1,.48160 5,.32866 1..55787
2 .04770 1,.35530 -0,.047795 1..94591 5,.15049 1,.46290
1,.85876 1,.01176 -0,.098571 1..72277 5,.15785 1..27669
1 .09368 0,.877337 -0,.191303 1,.60944 5,.03346 1..33129
1 .49274 0,.371404 -0,.145724 2,.11626 4,.94180 1,.35346
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HSDG HQ RELPAY UNEM POP NREC
1. 80011 1. 07443 -0.,270865 2. 05412 4. 86046 1. 46210
1. 85194 0. 771860 -0. 142327 2. 04122 5. 12254 1. 34049
2. 18411 1. 25977 -0. 146048 2. 27213 6.,04273 1. 42293
2. 12747 1. 41677 -0.,1-3165 2. 21920 5.,35746 1. 52601
1. 94925 1.,21284 -0.,229853 2. 47654 5.,78749 1. 20827
2. 22513 1. 39339 -0.,129014 2. 45101 6.,21647 1. 44928
1. 75804 1. 12917 -0.,124404 2. 20827 5,,52884 1.,54189
2. 09527 1.,29874 -0.,192099 2. 01490 5.,59593 1.,53176
1. 95783 1. 15412 -0.,135918 1. 91692 5. 98949 1.,11875
2. 14265 1. 43400 -0.,327996 2. 19722 5. 49748 1.,60420
1. 79412 0. 695512 -0.,194714 2. 26176 6.,10688 0. 933654
1. 92846 1. 05949 -0. 299492 1.,62924 5.,23393 1.,29986
1. 90872 0. 878583 -0. 222675 2.,12823 5. 65084 1. 34585
1. 99595 1. 09133 -0. 180332 2. 12823 5.,49346 1. 40928
2. 02092 0. 879303 -0.,283726 1.,87180 5.,20747 1.,28325
1. 59429 0. 381464 -0.,273288 1. 56862 5.,25689 1.,10441
2. 35996 1. 45240 -0.,409385 1. 80829 5.,08429 1.,47956
1. 68555 0. 317692 -0.,312758 1.,77495 5.,24299 1.,05043
2. 17988 1. 39809 -0.,304154 2.,07944 5.,31121 1.,25827
2. 06938 0. 979646 -0.,238777 1.,60944 5.,21476 1.,25294
1. 80924 0. 657206 -0.,267641 1.,48160 5.,35161 1.,07811
1. 63675 0. 509506 -0. 325009 1.,36098 5.,71505 0.,777187
1. 77516 0. 905151 -0.,090558 1.,77495 5.,48677 1.,59914
2. 04184 1. 14293 -0.,151340 1.,77495 5.,59877 1.,41605
2. 1128 1. 03693 -0.,054117 2.,06686 6.,03803 1.,41263
1. 30364 1. 04904 -0.,098135 1.,70475 5. 15955 1..48685
1. 60841 0. 553543 -0.,168532 1.,68640 5. , 34909 1.,25621
1. 36314 0. 849233 -0.,230965 2.,02815 5.,30775 1.,44686
1. 36811 0. 363713 -0.,304544 1.,43508 5,.35331 1.,07802
1.,88319 0.,961694 -0.,206829 1.,56862 5.,67949 1.,22024
1. 58826 0.,553262 -0.,022478 1.,72277 5,,87968 1.,18849
1.,80292 0. 926735 -0.,117979 1.,85630 5,.43629 1.,48141
1. 65724 0.,793057 -0.,249780 1.,74047 5,.32283 1.,43293
2.,05430 1.,34421 -0.,176212 1.,66771 5,.32782 1..64009
1.,66878 0.,941735 -0.,168532 1.,54756 5,,25877 1..37848
1,,56176 0.,804588 -0.,031183 1.,62924 5.,50896 1..10442
1.,75991 1.,07011 -0.,070013 1.,64866 5,.32516 1X ,39144
2,,06075 0.,994069 -0..194888 2.,14007 5,.00487 1.,39373
1.,83992 1.,01015 -0.,042360 1.,41099 5,.35975 1,.50822
1.,88318 1.,20024 -0.,022478 1.,80829 5..18158 1.,49172
1.,93312 0.,953093 -0..073253 1.,60944 5,.18894 1,.28031
1.,38818 0.,672022 -0..165985 1,.50408 5,.06455 1,.32401
1.,55067 0.,268854 -0.,120406 2.,06686 4,.97289 1,.15398
1.,63932 0.,676790 -0,.245548 1..60944 4,.89155 1,.44172
1.,81050 0.,681177 -0,.117009 1.,94591 5,.15363 1.,36404
2..11348 1.,09245 -0,.120730 2.,05412 6,.07382 1,,43771
2,,10477 1,,36722 -0,.107848 2.,01490 5,.38855 1.,42490
1.,96214 1,.06693 -0,.204535 2..32239 5,.81858 1,.18992
2..15735 1..18905 -0,.103696 2,.19722 6,.24757 1..48041
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HSDG HQ RELPAY UNEM POP NREC
1. 69566 0. 899977 -0.099086 2. 01490 5. 55993 1. 54504
1. 84263 0. 979646 -0.104228 1. 80829 5. 61613 1. 54169
1. 67692 0. 807039 -0.048046 1. 85630 6. 00970 1. 26401
1. 95084 1. 21572 -0.240124 2. 09186 5. 51768 1. 65093
1. 44026 0. 368180 -0.106842 2. 11626 6. 12709 1. 04509
1. 80720 1. 00545 -0.211621 1. 66771 5. 25414 1. 31265
1. 56674 0. 539561 -0.134804 1. 97408 5. 67104 1. 53010
1. 76359 0. 714848 -0.092461 1. 96009 5. 51366 1. 35256
1. 86240 0. 738472 -0.195854 1. 74047 5. 22767 1. 57619
1. 54074 0. 256296 -0.185417 1. 43508 5. 27709 1. 20815
2. 31668 1. 17027 -0.321514 1. 75786 5.,10450 1. 84298
1. 67509 0. 238066 -0.224887 1. 68640 5. 26319 1. 28382
2. 03819 1. 24784 -0.216283 1. 93152 5. 33141 1. 55160
1. 94129 0. 793316 -0.150905 1. 58924 5. 23496 1. 32528
1. 39092 0. 377584 -0.179769 1. 41099 5.,37181 1. 33054
1. 45843 0. 302616 -0.237138 1. 09861 5.,73526 1. 02923
1. 56969 0. 660548 -0.002686 1. 60944 5.,50697 1.,47986
1. 71340 0. 797764 -0.063468 1. 58924 5.,61897 1.,44319
1. 79109 0. 801378 -0.033754 1. 94591 6.,05824 1.,39873
1. 37419 0. 657983 -0.010264 1. 64866 5.,17975 1.,41756
1. 34245 0. 450790 -0.080661 1. 58924 5.,36929 1.,11772
1. 85744 0. 874587 -0.143093 1.,84055 5.,32795 1.,35135
1. 24121 0. 271929 -0.216673 1. 30833 5.,37352 1.,02681
1. 71126 0. 807587 -0.118957 1.,52606 5.,69969 1.,03903
1. 17930 0. 280136 0.065394 1.,66771 5.,89988 1.,21551
1. 60484 0.,687690 -0.030107 1.,72277 5.,45650 1.,45350
1. 41040 0.,573165 -0.161908 1.,52606 5.,34304 1.,47868
1. 51159 0.,743284 -0.088341 1.,28093 5.,34803 1.,47496
1. 39558 0.,623657 -0.080661 1.,33500 5..27898 1..20804
1. 28208 0.,499115 0.056689 1.,58924 5,.52916 1.,10083
1. 29973 0.,565438 0.017859 1.,43508 5.,34536 1.,03747
1. 79276 0.,743250 -0.107017 1.,77495 5,.02507 1..34394
1.,61855 0.,709088 0.045512 1. , 38629 5,.37996 1,.36014
1.,56901 0.,838476 0.065394 1.,66771 5,.20178 1,.46726
1.,72817 0.,762115 0.014619 1..41099 5,.20915 1,.23638
1.,69175 0..588570 -0.078114 1.,48160 5,.08475 1,.21000
1.,41872 0,.253928 -0.032535 1..96009. 4,.99310 0,.929876
1.,28061 0,.371446 -0.157676 1..19392 4,.91176 1,.35476
1,,42739 0..402113 -0.029138 1,.87180 5
,
.17384 1,.38640
1,,71795 0,.781211 -0.032859 1..94591 6,.09402 1,.36428
1..55255 0,.843155 -0.019976 1,.62924 5,.40875 1,.54539
1,.70502 0,.908801 -0.116663 2..01490 5,.83879 1,.18072
1..72686 0,.821475 -0.015825 1,.88707 6,.26777 1,.22019
1,.34251 0,.632476 -0.011215 1,.70475 5,.58013 1,.46093
1,.67764 0,.771612 -0.075039 1,.70475 5,.63692 1,.49084
1,.69658 0,.774135 -0.018857 1,.64866 6 .03048 1,.32118
1,.82609 .964330 -0.210935 1,.94591 5,.53846 1,.59496
1,.31950 .134399 -0.077653 2,.11626 6,.14787 0,.953989
1 .66627 .779521 -0.182432 1,.56862 5,.27492 1,.22210
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HSDG HQ RELPAY UNEM POP NREC
1.79086 0.563929 -0.105614 1.94591 5.69182 1. 33121
1.76738 0.609741 -0.063272 1.88707 5.53445 1. 36328
1.85733 0.603745 -0.166665 1.64866 5.24846 1. 61779
1.74703 0.399217 -0.156228 1.41099 5.29788 1. 26790
2.26490 1.16999 -0.292325 1.77495 5.12528 2. 01752
1.63867 0.067883 -0.195698 1.70475 5.28398 1. 37074
2.03117 1.19172 -0.187094 1.82455 5.35220 1. 66344
1.91514 0.549390 -0.121716 1.75786 5.25574 1. 44791
1.47746 0.400422 -0.150580 1.48160 5.39259 1. 32686
1.55585 0.267410 -0.207948 1.13140 5.75604 0. 990116
1.47167 0.585931 0.026503 1.56862 5.52775 1. 30345
1.35967 0.600525 -0.034279 1.56862 5.63975 1. 45528
1.15227 0.571259 0.062943 1.98787 6.07902 1. 31198
1.32303 0.441377 0.018926 1.64866 5.20053 1. 41229
1.35634 0.267351 -0.051472 1.58924 5.39008 1. 16063
1.77333 0.681954 -0.113904 1.75786 5.34873 1. 36069
1.23506 0.200411 -0.187483 1.22378 5. 39430 1. 17479
1.74174 0.748777 -0.089768 1.52606 5.72047 1. 22269
0.958692 -0.12157 0.094583 1.62924 5.92066 1. 08647
1.45224 0.519174 -0.000918 1.62924 5.47728 1. 35519
1.44632 0.581601 -0.132719 1.38629 5.36382 1. 38649
1.32946 0.571363 -0.059152 1.09861 5.36881 1.,44439
1.22674 0.272395 -0.051472 1.41099 5.29976 1.,15917
1.21163 0.333377 0.085878 1.56862 5.54995 1.,17377
1.76824 0.979173 0.047048 1.20893 4.71792 1.,73731
1.77525 0.750205 -0.077827 1.77495 5.04585 1.,29553
1.47759 0.694606 0.074701 1.28093 5.40074 1.,38884
1.32279 0.561264 0.094583 1.52606 5.22256 1.,42606
1.54999 0.525812 0.043808 1.25276 5.22993 1..20657
1.57783 0.328187 -0.048925 1.54756 5.10554 1.,30802
1.62991 0. 318841 -0.003345 1.77495 5.01388 1.,06784
1.21379 0.185454 -0.128487 1.13140 4.93254 1..31975
1.53041 0.407500 0.000051 1.77495 5.19462 1,.31653
1.50492 0.531587 -0.003670 1.75786 6.11480 1..38112
1.72352 1.01619 0.009213 1.66771 5.42953 1,.55709
1.36591 0.550607 -0.087474 1.79176 5.85957 1,.31355
1.54346 0.535823 0.013364 1.70475 6.28855 1,.32821
1.27535 0.570788 0.017975 1.64866 5.60091 1,.40835
1.86552 1.00176 -0.75039 1.79176 5.64180 1,.48348
1.83838 0.953327 -0.018857 1.60944 6.03537 1,.43372
2.03052 1.24663 -0.210935 2.24071 5.54335 1,.66821
1.58155 0.534119 -0.077653 2.06686 6.15275 1 .01814
1.94352 1.02839 -0.182432 1.74047 5.27980 1 .40606
1.90513 0.826477 -0.105614 1.94591 5.69671 1 .43579
1.93057 0.808682 -0.063272 1.94591 5.53933 1 .50470
2.04531 0.990960 -0.166665 1.66771 5.25334 1 .64031
1.87460 0.766206 -0.156228 1.45862 5.30276 1 .23538
2.36602 1.35810 -0.292325 1.70475 5.13016 2 .02991
1.78880 0.478404 -0.195698 1.77495 5.28886 1 .36658
2.09264 1.33111 -0.187094 1.74047 5.35708 1 .59660
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HSDG HQ RELPAY UNEM POP NREC
1.,98112 0.,954382 -0.,121716 1. 88707 5.,26063 1.,51016
1.,81181 0.,897087 -0.,150580 1.,66771 5.,39748 1.,43340
1.,66504 0.,554981 -0.,207948 1. 43508 5.,76092 1.,11431
1.,95466 0.,977988 0.,026503 1. 91692 5.,53264 1.,36608
1.,95932 1.,02082 -0.,034279 1.,68640 5.,64464 1.,44794
1.,98295 1.,03587 0.,062943 2.,46810 6.,08391 1.,31610
1.,83853 0.,992465 0.,018926 1.,97408 5.,20542 1.,55616
1.,65637 0.,607993 -0.,051472 1.,94591 5.,39496 1.,24622
1.,97476 0.,966119 -0.,113904 1.,96009 5.,35362 1.,52574
1.,52477 0.,642383 -0.,187483 1.,25276 5.,39919 1.,30278
1.,95501 1.,04532 -0.,089770 1.,43508 5.,72536 1.,27952
1.,54314 0. 538179 0.,094583 1.,96009 5.,92555 1.,22985
1.,86965 0.,860257 -0.,000918 2.,02815 5.,48216 1.,42158
1.,70716 0.,856867 -0.,132719 1.,74047 5.,36871 1.,39749
1.,59221 0.,853977 -0.,059152 1.,48160 5.,37369 1.,50257
1.,54223 0.,713934 -0.,051472 1.,62924 5.,30464 1.,44412
1.,78740 0.,941473 0,,085878 2.,02815 5.,55483 1.,45186
1.,37499 0.,652707 0.,047048 1.,68640 5.,37103 1.,13923
1.,92811 0.,962659 -0.,077827 2.,01490 5.,05074 1.,52851
1.,72610 0.,839678 0..074701 1.,43508 5,,40563 1..34548
1.,82480 1.,07103 0..094583 1.,54756 5,.22748 2.,17987
1.,80448 0.,839054 0,.043808 1.,36098 5,.23482 1..49859
1.,81875 0.,769816 -0,.048925 1.,60944 5,.11042 1,.52421
1.,55906 0.,388398 -0.,003345 1.,84055 5..01876 1,.18377
1.,41430 0.,435935 -0,.128487 1.,25276 4,.93743 1..29109
1.,71289 0.,647547 0..000051 1..82455 5,.19950 1,.38529
1.,86815 0.,855196 -0,.003670 1..79176 6,.11969 1,.40433
1..98010 1.,33991 0,.009213 1..75786 5,.43442 1..60524
1,.72349 0,.945632 -0,.087474 1..88707 5,.86445 1,.25841
1..75526 0,.786909 0,.013364 1,.68640 6,.29344 1,.45027
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